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In countries such as Germany, the legal system is such that ﬁrms are necessarily
stakeholder oriented. In others like Japan social convention achieves a similar eect.
We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented ﬁrms that are
concerned with employees and suppliers compared to pure shareholder-oriented ﬁrms.
We show that in a context of imperfect competition stakeholder ﬁrms have higher prices
and lower output than shareholder-oriented ﬁrms. Surprisingly, we also ﬁnd that ﬁrms
can be more valuable in a stakeholder society than in a shareholder society. With
globalization stakeholder ﬁrms and shareholder ﬁrms often compete. We identify the
circumstances where stakeholder ﬁrms are more valuable than shareholder ﬁrms, and
compare these asymmetric equilibria with symmetric equilibria with stakeholder and
shareholder ﬁrms. Finally, we show that, in some circumstances, ﬁrms may voluntarily
choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value.
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In their classic survey of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997; p. 738) outline
their focus in the following way: “Our perspective on corporate governance is a straightfor-
ward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and control. We
want to know how investors get the managers to give them back their money.” In the US
and UK and many other Anglo-Saxon countries there is wide agreement that this is what
corporate governance is about. The law is clear that shareholders are the owners of the ﬁrm
and managers have a ﬁduciary (i.e., very strong) duty to act in their interests, and most of
the academic literature on governance has taken this perspective (see, e.g., Becht, Bolton,
and Röell, 2003, for a more recent survey).
However, moving beyond the cases of the US and UK, ﬁrms’ objectives vary by country
and often deviate signiﬁcantly from the paradigm of shareholder value maximization. As
Denis and McConnell (2003; p. 6) point out in their survey of international corporate
governance: “in many European countries shareholder wealth maximization has not been
the only — or even necessarily the primary — goal of the board of directors.” To provide one
example, in Germany the legal system is quite explicit that ﬁrms have a duty to pursue
the interests of parties beyond just shareholders. The Germans have the system of co-
determination, in which employees and shareholders in large corporations have an equal
number of seats on the supervisory board of the company, so that the interests of both must
be taken into account (see Rieckers and Spindler, 2004, and Schmidt, 2004).
Germany is by no means the only country where the interests of parties other than
just shareholders have bearing on companies’ policies, and we document dierences across a
variety of countries in the next section. The common theme among these regimes, however,
can be seen from surveys of managers reported in Yoshimori (1995). Figure 1 shows the
choices of senior managers at a sample of major corporations in Japan, Germany, France,
the US, and the UK, between the following two alternatives:
(a) A company exists for the interest of all stakeholders (dark bar).
1(b) Shareholder interest should be given the ﬁrst priority (light bar).
In Japan the overwhelming response by 97% of those asked was that all stakeholders were
important. Germany and France are more like Japan in that 83% and 78%, respectively,
viewed the ﬁrm as being for all stakeholders. At the other end of the spectrum, managers
in the US and UK, by majorities of 76% and 71% respectively, stated that shareholders’
interests should be given priority.
T h es a m es u r v e ya l s oa s k e dt h em a n a g e r sw h a tt h e i rp r i o r i t i e sw e r ew i t hr e g a r dt od i v i -
dends and employee layos. Figure 2 shows the results of asking managers to choose between
the following speciﬁc alternatives:
(a) Executives should maintain dividend payments, even if they must lay o an u m b e r
of employees (dark bar).
(b) Executives should maintain stable employment, even if they must reduce dividends
(light bar).
As for the previous question, there is a sharp dierence between Japan, Germany and
France and the US and UK, in that in the former countries it is stakeholders’ interests more
generally - and in particular workers - that must be considered by ﬁrms. This suggests also
that ﬁrm continuity and employment preservation are important concerns in societies that
take stakeholders’ concerns into account.
The fact that in many countries the legal system or social convention requires ﬁrms to
take into account stakeholder concerns raises a number of important issues.
• How should the objective function of stakeholder oriented ﬁrms be modeled?
• H o wd o e st h i sd i erent objective function aect the ways that ﬁrms compete with each
other? What are the eects on the prices they set and, most important, on the stock
market values of the ﬁrms? How do these compare with the case where ﬁrms are solely
oriented toward shareholders? It is often suggested that taking stakeholders’ concerns
into account necessarily reduces overall ﬁrm value. Is this standard view correct?
2• With globalization ﬁrms from stakeholder oriented societies often compete with ﬁrms
that are shareholder oriented. How does this competition aect prices and ﬁrm values?
Which ﬁrms do better and how does the outcome compare to that with just stakeholder
or just shareholder oriented ﬁrms?
• Under what circumstances would ﬁrms voluntarily choose to be stakeholder oriented
even if it were not mandated by the law?
The purpose of this paper is to address these issues. We develop a simple model of
stakeholder governance where ﬁrms are concerned with their continuity as well as their
value. We start by considering a standard two-period duopoly model with imperfect price
competition where ﬁrms maximize shareholder value. In the ﬁrst period ﬁrms are subject
to a random shock to their costs and if this shock is large enough they may be unable to
continue operating. In choosing their ﬁrst period prices, ﬁrms take into account the eects
on ﬁrst period proﬁts as well as on the probability of surviving into the second period.
We introduce stakeholder governance by assuming that ﬁrms in stakeholder oriented soci-
eties put weight in their objective function on the eects of the ﬁrm’s failure on stakeholders
other than shareholders. The idea is that if ﬁrms do not survive, stakeholders face costs of
searching for new opportunities. If a ﬁrm is stakeholder-oriented, it takes (at least part of)
these costs into account in its objective function and thus in its decision making process. We
show that when ﬁrms put weight on stakeholders other than shareholders, this concern leads
to a softening of competition: ﬁrms charge higher prices and their probability of surviving
increases. This is because increasing its price increases a ﬁrm’s probability of survival, thus
beneﬁtting its stakeholders. Consequently, contrary to the usual view that a stakeholder
orientation is bad for shareholders, total ﬁrm value (i.e., shareholder value) can actually be
increased through a concern for other stakeholders. We identify the set of circumstances
where ﬁrm value is higher in a stakeholder society than in an otherwise identical shareholder
society, which corresponds to when the strategic beneﬁt of softening competition is greater
than the direct loss from deviating from the objective of maximizing shareholder value.
3We then consider the case of globalization, where it has become commonplace for ﬁrms
from shareholder societies to compete with ﬁrms from stakeholder societies. Again contrary
to the standard view, we identify circumstances where stakeholder ﬁrms are more valuable
than shareholder ﬁrms, as well as when all ﬁrms stand to beneﬁt from the stakeholder
orientation of just one of the ﬁrms. We also compare ﬁrm value across regimes, contrasting
asymmetric equilibria with symmetric equilibria where all ﬁrms are either stakeholder or
shareholder oriented.
The fact that ﬁrm value can be increased by a concern for stakeholders raises the possi-
bility that shareholders may want to put in place governance structures that commit them to
adopt a concern for other stakeholders even when not required to do so. We show that, when
a ﬁrm anticipates a su!ciently large reaction from its rival, it can improve its sharehold-
ers’ welfare by voluntarily choosing to take into account other stakeholders. We also show
that, even in circumstances where ﬁrms may not voluntarily adopt a stakeholder orientation,
such governance structures may nevertheless arise endogenously if consumers are more will-
ing to buy from ﬁrms that care about stakeholders other than shareholders.1 Interestingly,
this leads to a situation of self-enforcing societies where consumers induce ﬁrms to adopt
stakeholder concerns and consequently increase the value to shareholders.
Our paper is related to a number of strands of literature. The ﬁrst is concerned with
ﬁrms’ objective functions. Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2008) study theoretically how critical
employees, who represent “stakeholders” in the ﬁrm, can play a crucial role in the internal
governance of the ﬁrm. In particular, they argue that younger managers in line for upper
management positions may be more concerned with maintaining continuity of the ﬁrm and
may inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s investments in a way that increases shareholder value. Acharya, Myers
and Rajan’s purpose is to understand the internal operations of the ﬁrm and how this leads
to concerns for continuity. Our paper is complementary in that we are interested in the
1An alternative could be that ﬁrms lobby to put in place government regulations requiring a more
stakeholder-friendly approach to governance. Such political economy considerations may help explain the
legal requirements of codetermination in Germany, among other countries. See Pagano and Volpin (2005)
for a broader discussion of the interaction between employment protection and the electoral system.
4eects of concerns for continuity on market equilibrium. Blinder (1993) models the objective
function of Japanese ﬁrms as the weighted sum of shareholder proﬁts and a function of
employee earnings and shows that this leads ﬁrms to maximize revenue. In contrast, we put
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc costs and beneﬁts stakeholders receive in the objective function and show
that concern for stakeholders leads to a concern for survival which softens competition.
Much of the previous literature in ﬁnance and economics on stakeholder governance has
been concerned with the normative issue of whether it is socially optimal for ﬁrms to pursue
anything other than shareholder interests. Tirole (2001, 2006) takes a negative view on the
desirability of adopting a stakeholder-oriented objective for the ﬁrm. The reason is that if
workers and other stakeholders have interests that diverge from those of shareholders, it is
extremely di!cult to charge managers with anything other than the pure maximization of
ﬁrm value because there are no reliable measures of stakeholder welfare. Allen and Gale
(2000, Chapter 12) and Allen (2005) take a more positive view arguing that changing ﬁrms’
objective functions from just focusing on shareholder wealth can correct for market failures
and thus improve welfare. Bris and Brisley (2005) show that having lower investor protection
for minority shareholders changes the way in which ﬁrms compete, leading to higher output
and lower prices. This makes consumers better o and can improve social welfare. Claessens
and Ueda (2008) empirically consider the role of relative changes in legal protection for
dierent classes of stakeholders in the US. They ﬁnd that improving stakeholder protection
can improve e!ciency. For example, judicial decisions enhancing employment protection can
improve the growth of more skilled-labor, knowledge and intangible-asset intensive industries.
Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008) ﬁnd empirically that a ﬁrm’s stakeholders, such as its
customers or its suppliers, can play a “monitoring” role and help improve e!ciency. This is
particularly the case in more competitive industries where greater amounts of information are
available, making such monitoring less costly and more eective, as well as in relationship-
intensive industries. In contrast to these papers, our focus is positive in that stakeholder
governance is mandated in many countries and we are concerned with its likely eects.
5There is a long tradition in ﬁnance going back to at least Jensen and Meckling (1976)
of viewing corporate governance as being about how to resolve agency issues. In this view,
dierent stakeholders such as employees and bondholders need to be provided with the
correct incentives and this is why they may need to be included in the governance process.
The foundation of this approach is that while shareholders own the ﬁrm and their objective
is to maximize its value, they are not necessarily directly involved in running the ﬁrm. In
contrast, in our analysis there is no agency problem, and our starting point is that many
countries have in place legal requirements that stakeholders be included in the governance
process.
There is also a related literature in industrial organization. Sklivas (1987) shows that
in oligopolistic industries shareholders can choose managerial incentives to alter the way in
which ﬁrms compete and shows that ﬁrm value can be aected in this way. Fershtman and
Judd (1987) also consider the interaction between managerial incentives and competition
in oligopolistic markets. They show that compensation contracts can optimally depend on
things other than proﬁts such as sales. In a similar spirit, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) use
a framework of imperfectly competitive product markets to explain the optimality of com-
pensation contracts for managers based on both own and rival performance. Furthermore,
there is a large literature, starting with Brander and Lewis (1986) and more recently Das-
gupta and Titman (1998), on how debt aects competition and showing that debt acts as a
precommitment device that changes the way in which ﬁrms compete (Allen, 2000, contains a
discussion of this literature). Our approach is related in that stakeholder governance commits
the ﬁrms to be less aggressive, but we abstract from any additional strategic considerations
introduced by incentive contracts or limited liability.
In contrast to ﬁnance and economics, stakeholder governance has received considerable
attention in other disciplines. There is a large managerial literature on how stakeholder
governance can be implemented. For example, Blair (1995) has suggested that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
investments by employees and other stakeholders are crucial. She argues that these parties
6should be given residual claimant status along with shareholders. O’Sullivan (2000) stresses
the importance of building organizations that are able to continuously innovate and ensuring
all stakeholders are involved in this process. There is also a large legal literature that is
surveyed in Licht (2003).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss how gov-
ernance arrangements vary across countries, and provide some institutional details. Section
3 presents a model analyzing the case where ﬁrms care about other stakeholders in addition
to shareholders. Section 4 looks at globalization where dierent types of ﬁrms compete with
each other. Section 5 focuses on the incentives of ﬁrms to become stakeholder oriented and
the possibility of having self-enforcing stakeholder economies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Governance Arrangements in Dierent Countries
As discussed above, the system of co-determination in Germany provides a clear example
of a country where ﬁrms’ objectives encompass a broader set of stakeholders in the ﬁrm
than merely those who own shares. However, Germany is by no means the only country
with such a system. For example, China has a two-board system with a supervisory board
above the management board. The 2005 reforms in China’s Company Law required that
employee representatives account for no less than one third of the supervisory board. The
reforms also codiﬁed corporate social responsibility requiring that ﬁrms bear in mind their
social responsibilities in conducting their business operations. In line with the ﬁndings of
our paper, Wang and Huang (2006) argue that the rationale for the imposition of corporate
social responsibility is to prevent companies from maximizing their interests at the expense
of others in the community.
As documented by Wymeersch (1998), several other countries have some form of co-
determination. Austria has a system of co-determination similar to that in Germany. The
Netherlands has a system known as the structuurvennootschap that is applicable to all larger
7companies except for those with an international group structure such as Royal Dutch Shell
and Unilever. Here the labor representation is indirect in that directors must have the
conﬁdence of employees. Members of the supervisory board must take care of “the interest
of the company and its related enterprise” (Wymeersch, 1998, p. 1144).
In Denmark, Sweden, and Luxembourg, there is employee representation on one-tier
boards. In Denmark, a third of the board is elected by employees (with a minimum of
two) in companies with more than 35 employees. In Sweden, companies with more than 25
employees must have two labor representatives on the board, while companies with more
than 1,000 employees must have three. The rights and duties of these board members are
the same as all other board members. In Luxembourg, ﬁrms with more than 1,000 employees
and some ﬁrms with a state connection have one third of the board elected by the employees.
The system in France is dierent in that for ﬁrms with more than ﬁfty workers two
workers’ representatives act as observers at board meetings, but do not have the right to
vote. More conventional co-determination systems exist for privatized public sector ﬁrms
and can be introduced voluntarily by ﬁrms. Similarly, in Finland companies can voluntarily
adopt employee representation on the board. More than 300 companies have reportedly done
this (Wymeersch, 1998, p. 1141).
Another type of worker participation in decision making is on the “enterprise council.”
These are concerned with employment conditions such as layosa n dp l a n tc l o s u r e s .C o m -
panies with at least 1,000 employees - of which there are 150 or more in two or more EU
countries - must have a “European Works Council.”
In Japan, the situation is yet again dierent from the US and UK. Managers do not
have a ﬁduciary responsibility to shareholders. The legal obligation of directors is such that
they may be liable for gross negligence in the performance of their duties, including the duty
to supervise (Scott, 1998). In practice, it is widely accepted that stakeholder interests and
in particular employee interests play a predominant role (see Dore, 2000, and Jackson and
Miyajima, 2007).
8It is readily seen that, while the speciﬁcs of the systems of governance in each country vary
widely, they have as a common objective the inclusion of parties beyond shareholders into
ﬁrms’ decision-making processes. In particular, in many countries workers play a prominent
role, being regarded as important stakeholders in the ﬁrm. The analysis that follows focuses
on this aspect of what we term “stakeholder governance.”
3 Models of Governance
In this section we develop a simple model where dierent forms of governance are associated
with dierent objective functions for the ﬁrms. We start with the standard case where ﬁrms
maximize shareholder value. We then analyze how a concern for stakeholders aects the way
ﬁrms compete and set prices. Finally, we compare the overall value of ﬁrms in the dierent
governance structures and identify conditions where stakeholder ﬁrms are more valuable than
shareholder ﬁrms.
3.1 Shareholder ﬁrms
Consider ﬁrst a simple one-period model where two ﬁrms, l 5 {1>2},o er dierentiated
products and compete in prices. Each ﬁrm l faces a demand curve given by
Gl = D  esl + gsm
for l 6= m,w h e r esl and sm are the prices charged by ﬁrms l and m, respectively, and e and g
depend on consumers’ preferences over the good sold by ﬁrm l relative to that sold by ﬁrm
m. We assume throughout that e  g,s ot h a tﬁ r ml’s demand is at least as sensitive to its
own price as it is to the price charged by its competitor. Each ﬁrm l chooses its price to
maximize proﬁt as given by
max
sl
l =m a x
sl
(sl  f)Gl(sl)=m a x
sl
(sl  f)(D  esl + gsm)>
9where f represents the marginal cost of producing one unit of output. We assume that f is
the same for both ﬁrms. The ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization gives
(D  esl + gsm)  (sl  f)e =0 ,( 1 )
which yields
sl =
D + gsm + fe
2e
=






In order to ensure that proﬁts are positive, we assume that b sAf .As u !cient condition for
this is that D  f(e  g) A 0.
We now enrich this basic model in various directions. We ﬁrst introduce a second period
identical to the ﬁrst. We then assume that each ﬁrm l is subject to a shock to its marginal
costs in period 1, so that e fl = f +e l,w h e r ee l is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function I(=), which we assume is uniform on the interval [>].F i r m l can
operate in period 2 only if its proﬁt in the ﬁrst period, l1,i sn o n n e g a t i v eo r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,
if the shock is not too large: l1  0 / l  sl1  f.F i r ml’s problem is to choose the price
that maximizes its overall market value, Yl,a sg i v e nb y
max
sl1
Yl = H[e l1]+P r ( e l  sl1  f)
£
(1  Pr(e m  sm1  f))
P




= H[e l1]+I(sl1  f)[(1  I(sm1  f))
P
2 + I(sm1  f)
G
2 ]=
The ﬁrst term represents the expected proﬁt in the ﬁrst period, while the second term is
what ﬁrm l obtains in expectation in the second period if it survives. This equals P
2 when
it is the only ﬁrm surviving and G
2 when both ﬁrms are still active. The ﬁrm can also fail, in
which case it gets zero proﬁts. Noting that I(sl1  f)=
sl13f+
2 , the maximization problem
10c a nb ew r i t t e na s
max
sl1
Yl =( sl1  f)Gl(sl1)+

















The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
CYl
Csl1
















The ﬁrst two terms represent the total marginal eect of a change in sl1 on the expected
ﬁrst-period proﬁt. The last term captures the eect of a change in sl1 on the second-period
proﬁt of ﬁrm l through the marginal change in its survival probability, 1
2.




































A similar expression holds for the competitor’s price, sm1. Note that, while prices are
normally strategic complements in models of imperfect competition, the concern for survival
introduces an element of strategic substitutability here. If ﬁrm m follows ﬁrm l and also
increases its own price, both ﬁrms have a higher probability of survival and will be more
likely to obtain G
2 instead of P
2 in the second period. This provides an incentive to ﬁrm l to
deviate and reduce its own price. In order to prevent this deviation from being proﬁtable, we
assume throughout that
C2Yl
Csl1Csm1  0 so that prices are strategic complements. This condition
















where i is the density function of the shocke l.S i n c ei(=)= 1
2 and
C2H[l1]











42  J  0.( 6 )
As we shall see, the function J will play a crucial role in the analysis. The ﬁrst term
of the function represents the sensitivity of ﬁrm l’s demand to the price charged by its
competitor, while the second term captures the foregone payo, P
2  G
2 ,f o rﬁ r ml due to
the higher survival probability of ﬁrm m. The condition then boils down to a restriction on
the dierence P
2  G
2 so that the positive eect of a higher ﬁrst-period price by ﬁrm m on
ﬁrm l’s ﬁrst-period proﬁt dominates the negative eect that a higher probability of survival
of ﬁrm m has on ﬁrm l’s second-period proﬁt. Note that this restriction also guarantees that
the standard regularity condition (see Dixit, 1986) that






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
? 1 is always satisﬁed.
Having this in mind, we can now ﬁnd the unique symmetric equilibrium price from (4)
as
b s1 =









If we compare this with the one-period price b s we obtain that
b s1  b s =
( + f  b s)P
2 +(   f + b s)G
2




if f?b s?f+ . This means that ﬁrms increase prices when they are concerned about
survival relative to what they would charge if they had no such concern. The intuition
behind this result is simple. When ﬁrms care about surviving until period 2, they maximize
their expected proﬁts across both periods. Firms set higher prices than in the one-period
model since their probability of survival until period 2, Pr(e l  sl1f), is increasing in their
ﬁrst-period price, sl1. In other words, the concern for survival softens competition and, by
raising prices, also reduces output.
123.2 Stakeholder ﬁrms
So far we have considered the case where ﬁrms maximize their expected proﬁts taking only
shareholder value into account. However, as discussed earlier, in many countries the le-
gal system and social environment are such that ﬁrms also consider the interests of other
stakeholders, such as workers or suppliers, in adopting strategic decisions. In Germany, for
example, co-determination requires that in large ﬁrms workers have representation on the
supervisory board, thus having an inﬂuence in the strategic direction of the company. In
France, workers’ representatives are able to attend board meetings and thus change the way
meetings are conducted. By requiring consensus in decision making processes as in Japan
(see Aoki, 1990), ﬁrms are likely to put a weight on employees’ interests directly.
To capture the concern for stakeholders in our model, we modify the ﬁrm’s objective
function from the previous section to capture the notion that the non-survival of a ﬁrm
aects not only shareholders, but also other parties, like employees and suppliers. Such
parties would likely have to bear some (nonpecuniary) costs associated with, for example,
having to ﬁnd new jobs and customers. If the ﬁrm is interested in stakeholders other than
shareholders, it internalizes (at least partly) the negative externality its failure imposes on
other parties who depend on the ﬁrm by attaching some weight to these costs in its objective
function.2 This modiﬁes the objective function for ﬁrm l as follows:
max
sl1
ll = Yl  (1  I(sl1  f))Nl (8)
= H[l1]+I(sl1  f)[(1  I(sm1  f))
P
2 + I(sm1  f)
G
2 ]  (1  I(sl1  f))Nl
where Nl is the cost borne by stakeholders that is internalized by ﬁrm l. Since this is
determined by the legal and social environment it is the same for all ﬁrms so that
Nl = Nm = N=
2See Tirole (2006) for a recent discussion of stakeholder governance along these lines.
13This approach is one way to build concern for stakeholders into the objective function of the
ﬁrm in line with various of the existing institutional arrangements described above. Another
approach would be to assume that in addition to the costs stakeholders incur under the
ﬁrm’s failure, they also earn rents when the ﬁrm stays solvent. This would imply the ﬁrm
also puts weight on the beneﬁts to stakeholders in case of survival by an additional positive
term nl in the objective function, received only if the ﬁrm survives across periods. Similar
results obtain under that alternative speciﬁcation of a stakeholder objective function.
With (8) as the objective function for ﬁrms, it can be shown similarly to (7) that















2 = It can be seen immediately that
Ce s1N
CN A 0. This establishes
that a concern for stakeholders serves to soften competition further by increasing prices and
reducing quantity in the ﬁrst period. The intuition is again simple. As stakeholder ﬁrms care
even more about surviving than shareholder ﬁrms, they charge higher prices to guarantee a
higher probability of survival. The reduction in competition induced by ﬁrms’ concern for
survival leads to a greater markup over marginal cost, and thus lower output. An interesting
implication of this concern for stakeholders is that ﬁrms’ production in stakeholder societies
is further away from the e!ciency benchmark provided by the perfect competition paradigm.
3.3 Firm Value
Now that we have derived the equilibrium prices set by shareholder and stakeholder ﬁrms,
we can turn to the comparison of the ﬁrms’ values under the two governance structures. We
start with the value of a shareholder ﬁrm. Substituting the equilibrium symmetric price b s1
as in (7) for both sl1 and sm1 into (2) and rearranging the terms, we obtain the following
14expression for the equilibrium value of a shareholder ﬁrm:
b YVKD = Df +
(f  )
42 [( + f)
P














b s1  (e  J) b s
2
1=
We note that b YVKD is concave in the equilibrium price b s1. By substituting in for b s1
it is possible to obtain a (complex) closed form expression in terms of exogenous variables,
which we omit here for simplicity.
Similarly, by substituting b s1N instead of b s for both sl1 and sm1 into (2), we can ﬁnd an
expression for the equilibrium value of a stakeholder ﬁrm as a quadratic function of N:
















D  f(e  g)+P
2 @2
D  f(e  g)+P
2 @2+2 e
? 1=
It is often argued that stakeholder orientation will result in a fall in the value of the ﬁrm
compared to shareholder orientation. We next show that this is in fact not the case. Firms
in stakeholder-oriented economies can have a higher overall value than those in shareholder-
oriented economies. The expression for b YVWD(N) provides a simple way of showing this. The
following proposition summarizes our result.
Proposition 1 Deﬁne NW = J@[2(e  J)].( a )I fJ A 0 and 0 ?N?N W,t h e nﬁ r m s
in a stakeholder society have higher value than ﬁrms in a shareholder society.
(b) If J A 0 and NAN W,o ri fJ ? 0, then ﬁrms in a stakeholder society have a lower
value than ﬁrms in a shareholder society.
15This result is established directly from inspection of (12) and can be easily understood
graphically from Figure 3. Since eAgand P
2 A G
2 , b YVWD(N) is a concave function of N.
In Figure 3, the intercept at N =0represents ﬁrm value in a shareholder society. Firms in
a stakeholder society will be more valuable provided that b YVWD(N) has a positive slope at
N =0and that 0 ?N?N W as illustrated in the ﬁgure by the upper line, where NW is the
value of N such that b YVWD(N)=b YVKD. By contrast, shareholder ﬁrms are more valuable
if NAN W since the weight on survival is so large that ﬁrms charge prices that are so high
that they lead to lower value. Similarly, if b YVWD(N) h a san e g a t i v es l o p ea tN =0then the
value of ﬁrms in a stakeholder society is always lower.
T h es i g no ft h es l o p eo fb YVWD(N) at N =0is determined by the sign of J. To establish
when J will be positive or negative, we vary P
2 in the range G
2  P
2  G
2 +4g2 so that
the strategic complementarity condition (6) is satisﬁed. For P
2 = G
2 , J equals g A 0;
while for P
2 = G
2 +4 g2, it becomes (  1)g?0 since ?1.M o r e o v e r ,d i erentiating
J twice with respect to P
2 it can be seen that the expression is concave in P
2 = Using this
with the initial positive sign and subsequent negative sign of J, it follows there exists a
unique solution P
2 such that J =0in the relevant range. All this implies that J A 0 for
P
2 ? P
2 ,a n dJ ? 0 for P
2 A P
2 .F o rP
2 = G
2 , ﬁrms in a stakeholder society are more
valuable than in a shareholder society for 0 ?N?N W.A s P
2 increases, the range of N
for which stakeholder ﬁrms are more valuable decreases. When P
2 = P
2 ,s t a k e h o l d e rﬁ r m s
cease to be more valuable than shareholder ﬁrms for any N.
The result illustrates that shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests are not necessarily
opposed but rather can be aligned. This happens when ﬁrms’ stakeholder orientation serves
to soften competition su!ciently. Then, the higher prices charged by stakeholder-oriented
ﬁrms beneﬁt the shareholders in terms of higher overall proﬁts and the stakeholders in terms
of higher probability of survival. However, when the ﬁrms’ stakeholder orientation is too
large (i.e., when N is too big), being stakeholder oriented actually decreases ﬁrm value since
it forces ﬁrms to focus too much on survival at the cost of losing proﬁtability and market
16value. Likewise, when P
2 is su!ciently large, the strategic beneﬁt of committing to charge
a higher price is low since each ﬁrm wants to be the only ﬁrm in operation in future periods.
This can be seen from equation (6), where it is clear that as P
2 increases the value of
committing to charge a high price through a stakeholder orientation decreases. When P
2 is
so large that J ? 0, ﬁrms are worse o as a result of their stakeholder orientation.
As already noted above, even if having ﬁrms caring about stakeholders can be beneﬁcial
for both shareholders and other stakeholders, it may not enhance total welfare. The reason
is that consumers are worse o due to the higher prices stakeholder ﬁrms charge and the
consequent reduction in output.
4 Globalization: Competition between Shareholder and
Stakeholder Firms
So far we have considered the case where all ﬁrms operate in the same legal environment
and have contrasted the eects of having stakeholder concerns in place. We now consider a
setting where ﬁrms of dierent types compete together. This type of competition may occur
as a result of globalization where ﬁrms from shareholder societies (such as the US) compete
with those in countries where some measure of stakeholder governance is mandated (such as
Germany). We ﬁrst consider the circumstances where a stakeholder ﬁrm is more valuable
than the shareholder ﬁrm with which it competes, and vice-versa. We then perform a cross-
regime analysis and compare the situations with mixed competition with the situations where
only stakeholder ﬁrms or only shareholder ﬁrms are active.
We adopt the convention that ﬁrm l is the shareholder ﬁrm and ﬁrm m is the stakeholder
ﬁrm so that Nl =0and Nm A 0. With this in mind, ﬁrm l’s reaction function is given by
(4), while ﬁrm m’s reaction function is given by
sm1 =
























Nm,( 1 3 )
17where Nm represents the concern for stakeholder interests embedded in the legal and social
environment in ﬁrm m’s home country. Solving the two reaction functions, (4) and (13), gives
the following closed form solutions for the equilibrium prices of the two ﬁrms:
















where from (2)  = J@2e?1. Using this, it can be shown straightforwardly that
b s1 ? b sl1 ? b sm1 ? b s1N>
w h e r en o t et h a tw eh a v es e tNm = N to be able to compare the asymmetric equilibrium with
one stakeholder ﬁrm with the equilibrium with two stakeholder ﬁrms analyzed above. These
inequalities show that both shareholder and stakeholder prices are higher in the asymmetric
globalization equilibrium than in the symmetric shareholder equilibrium. Moreover, in the
asymmetric equilibrium the price set by the shareholder ﬁrm is lower than the price set by
the stakeholder ﬁrm. Finally, both prices in the asymmetric globalization equilibrium are
lower than in the symmetric stakeholder equilibrium.
The intuition behind these last results hinges once again on the eect of the concern for
stakeholders on ﬁrms’ incentives in setting prices. Given that prices are strategic comple-
ments, the stakeholder ﬁrm “follows” its rival shareholder ﬁrm in setting a price lower than
when its rival was a stakeholder ﬁrm. However, the concern for stakeholders prevents the
stakeholder ﬁrm from reducing its price to the level charged by the shareholder ﬁrm.
Turning next to the comparison of values in the asymmetric equilibria, we substitute (14)
and (15) into (2) and the corresponding expression for Ym,a n do b t a i n :























and b Yl(0>N m) refers to the equilibrium value of shareholder ﬁrm l competing against stake-
holder ﬁrm m, while b Ym(0>N m) is the equilibrium value of stakeholder ﬁrm m when competing
against the shareholder ﬁrm l. These expressions allow us to compare the values of the
shareholder and stakeholder ﬁrms in the asymmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium with one stakeholder ﬁrm and one shareholder ﬁrm,
(a) if J ? 0 and 0 ?N m ?N 0,w h e r eN0 is the value of N that satisﬁes b Yl(0>N0)=
b Ym(0>N0), the stakeholder ﬁrm is more valuable than the shareholder ﬁrm;
(b) if J ? 0 and Nm AN 0,o ri fJ A 0, the shareholder ﬁrm is more valuable than the
stakeholder ﬁrm.
The proposition follows from a simple comparison of (16) and (17). Since eAg ,w eh a v e
that b Yl(0>N m) is convex and b Ym(0>N m) is concave in Nm,a n dt h e i rs l o p e sa tNm =0depend on
the sign of J.I nF i g u r e4 ,J ? 0 and both b Yl(0>N m) and b Ym(0>N m) are downward sloping
at Nm =0 , with the slope of the former less than that of the latter since A1. b Yl(0>N m)
and b Ym(0>N m) cross at N0,s ot h a tf o rNm above this level the shareholder ﬁrm is always more
valuable. In Figure 5, where J A 0, the slopes of both b Yl(0>N m) and b Ym(0>N m) at Nm =0
are positive, with that of the shareholder ﬁrm being greater than that of the stakeholder
ﬁrm. The shareholder ﬁrm is therefore more valuable for any positive Nm when J A 0.
For low values of ﬁrm m’s stakeholder orientation (i.e., for Nm ?N 0), it is clear that which
ﬁrm is better o depends on whether or not having a stakeholder orientation is beneﬁcial.
From Proposition 1 we know that when J ? 0, being forced to internalize stakeholders’
concerns actually leads ﬁrms to have a lower value, even if it beneﬁts a ﬁrm’s stakeholders
by increasing the probability of survival for the ﬁrm. However, from (16) and (17) we see
19that, since A1  , the shareholder ﬁrm’s value is more sensitive to changes in Nm than
the stakeholder ﬁrm (for relatively small values of Nm). Therefore, Proposition 2 establishes
that in such cases a shareholder ﬁrm is worse o than the stakeholder ﬁrm against which
it competes. Not only does the shareholder ﬁrm suer a loss relative to when it competes
against another shareholder ﬁrm (i.e., b Yl(0>N m) ? b YVKD), its losses are also greater than the
losses for the stakeholder ﬁrm. Note as well that, as before, this occurs only when P
2 ,t h e
value of being a monopolist in the second period, is su!ciently high so that J ? 0.I nt h i s
case, strategic complementarities are relatively low, and ﬁrms are not able to beneﬁt from
the deviation away from value maximization that is embodied in a stakeholder objective
function.
Proposition 2 also establishes that when stakeholder concerns are su!ciently large (i.e.,
for Nm AN 0), a shareholder-oriented ﬁrm always does better when competing against a
stakeholder-oriented ﬁrm. The intuition for this case is relatively straightforward: when ﬁrm
m has a strong orientation towards stakeholders, it focuses primarily on survival by charging
very high prices at the sacriﬁce of proﬁtability. The shareholder ﬁrm, ﬁrm l, beneﬁts from
these higher prices, but since it is not as concerned about survival, it gains relative to its
stakeholder rival.
The more interesting case arises when J A 0, which occurs when P
2 is su!ciently small.
For this case, Proposition 1 shows having a stakeholder orientation is beneﬁcial to both ﬁrms
due to the commitment to further soften competition. Here, Proposition 2 suggests that the
shareholder ﬁrm beneﬁts more than the stakeholder ﬁrm: the shareholder gets to free-ride
on the increase in price arising out of ﬁrm m’s stakeholder orientation, but does not itself
have to deviate away from the maximization of shareholder value.
Having analyzed the asymmetric equilibrium, we can compare the payos to ﬁrms in this
equilibrium against the two other alternative regimes: where both ﬁrms are stakeholders
or where they are both shareholders. We start with a comparison with the symmetric
shareholder equilibrium.
20Proposition 3 (a) If J ? 0, the value of the symmetric shareholder ﬁrm is greater than
the asymmetric shareholder ﬁrm for 0 ?N?N 00,w h e r eN00 satisﬁes b Yl(0>N00)=b YVKD,a n d
is always greater than the value of the asymmetric stakeholder ﬁrm.
(b) If J A 0, the value of the symmetric shareholder ﬁrm is always less than the asym-
metric shareholder ﬁrm and is less than the asymmetric stakeholder ﬁrm for 0 ?N?N †,
where N† satisﬁes b Ym(0>N†)=b YVKD.
This proposition can be established directly from inspection of (11), (16), and (17), and is
also illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 4, the ﬁrst part of the result for J ? 0 follows
from the negative derivative at Nm =0and the convexity of b Yl(0>N m). The second part of the
result follows from the negative derivative at Nm =0and the concavity of b Ym(0>N m).F i g u r e
5s h o w st h ec a s ew h e r eJ A 0. The results similarly follow from the positive derivatives at
Nm =0 , the convexity of b Yl(0>N m) and the concavity of b Ym(0>N m).
Proposition 3 again points to the importance of the commitment to soften competition
that is embodied in ﬁrms’ stakeholder-oriented governance structures. When such a com-
m i t m e n ti sv a l u a b l e( i . e . ,w h e nP
2 is relatively small, so that J A 0), a shareholder ﬁrm
competing against a stakeholder ﬁrm can beneﬁt from the stakeholder ﬁrm’s higher prices.
In this instance, a shareholder ﬁrm would prefer to compete in a stakeholder-oriented market
rather than one where shareholder focus is the norm, if the shareholder ﬁrm does not itself
change its governance structure.
On the other hand, when internalizing stakeholder concerns is on net bad for ﬁrms (i.e.,
when P
2 is relatively large, so that J ? 0), a shareholder ﬁrm prefers to compete with
other shareholder ﬁrms rather than compete with a stakeholder ﬁrm. This occurs because
the low level of complementarities implied by J ? 0 means that the stakeholder ﬁrm’s focus
on issues other than pure value maximization also drags down the value of the shareholder
ﬁrm.
Next we consider the comparison with the symmetric stakeholder equilibrium. Note that
again we set here Nm = N.
21Proposition 4 (a) If J ? 0, the value of the symmetric stakeholder ﬁrm is always less
than the value of the asymmetric shareholder ﬁrm and is less than that of the asymmetric
stakeholder ﬁrm for 0 ?N?N 000 where N000 satisﬁes b Ym(0>N000)=b YVWD(N000).
(b) If J A 0, the value of the symmetric stakeholder ﬁrm is greater than the asymmetric
shareholder for 0 ?N?N †† where N†† satisﬁes b Yl(0>N††)=b YVWD(N††),a n di sa l w a y s
greater than that of the asymmetric stakeholder ﬁrm.
This proposition can be established directly from inspection of (12), (16), and (17), and
is again illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. The results follow from the sign of the derivative
at N =0 ,t h ec o n v e x i t yo fb Yl(0>N m) and the concavity of b Ym(0>N m) and b YVWD(N) in the
u s u a lw a y .N o t et h a ti nF i g u r e5w h e r eJ A 0, b Ym(0>N m) and b YVWD(N) do not intersect for
NA0.T h i sc a nb es h o w nb yﬁ r s tn o t i n gt h a tt h ec o e !cient of Nm in (17) is smaller than
the coe!cient of N in (12) since ?1. Moreover, from the comparison of the coe!cients
of N2
m and N2, it can be seen that the absolute value of the coe!cient in (17) is larger if
2e(2e2  J2) A (e  j)(2e + J)2. This condition is equivalent to J3 + eJ2 A 0,w h i c hi s
always satisﬁed since JA0.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is similar to that presented above for Propositions 2 and
3. When the strategic impact of having a stakeholder orientation is negative, which occurs
when J ? 0, a stakeholder ﬁrm competing in a stakeholder-oriented market is worse o
than if it competes with a shareholder ﬁrm. The reason is that, since the shareholder ﬁrm
focuses on pure value maximization, the strategic response of the stakeholder ﬁrm is also
to not focus excessively on stakeholders, thus choosing a price that is not overly high and
losing less money as a result. By contrast, when complementarities are su!ciently strong
that ﬁrms beneﬁt from being stakeholder-oriented (i.e., when J A 0), the ﬁrms that beneﬁt
the most are those that are most able to credibly commit to softening competition. Since a
stakeholder governance structure does just that, stakeholder ﬁrms competing against other
stakeholder ﬁrms reap the greatest beneﬁt.
One interesting implication of the analysis in this section is that ﬁrms with a focus on
22the maximization of only shareholder value are likely to encounter greater resistance when
entering a market that is stakeholder oriented than would ﬁrms that are more stakeholder
friendly, since the entry of the former is more detrimental to incumbent ﬁrms (as long as
a stakeholder orientation creates value, i.e., if J A 0). This can be seen from Proposition
4, which establishes that a stakeholder ﬁrm competing with another stakeholder ﬁrm will
be better o than if it competes with a shareholder ﬁrm. This resistance may come either
directly from the existing ﬁrms, or from government policies geared toward protecting do-
mestic ﬁrms from the threat of foreign entry. Moreover, this resistance is likely to be greatest
in countries where stakeholder governance is the norm, since the ﬁrms in these countries are
the ones most likely to be aected by the entry of ﬁrms with only a shareholder focus.
Similarly, Proposition 4 also implies that a shareholder ﬁrm entering a stakeholder market
may in fact prefer to allow its foreign operations to adopt the norm in that market and mimic
the behavior of a stakeholder-oriented ﬁrm. By doing so, they further soften competition and
raise proﬁts, not only for themselves but also for the incumbent stakeholder since, as per the
proposition, competition among all stakeholder ﬁrms generates the most value for all ﬁrms.
By contrast, the same proposition also tells us that a stakeholder ﬁrm would never choose
to change its governance structure even when entering a shareholder-oriented market. This
is because, even though the ﬁrm’s stakeholder orientation puts it at a disadvantage relative
to the shareholder ﬁrm, its proﬁts are nevertheless higher with a stakeholder governance
structure than as a shareholder ﬁrm.
5 Self-enforcing Stakeholder Societies
S of a rw eh a v ea n a l y z e dt h ee ect of a concern for stakeholders on ﬁrms’ equilibrium prices,
quantities, and proﬁts. In doing this we have exogenously speciﬁed ﬁrms’ objective functions,
taking as given that ﬁrms care about stakeholders, either from convention or because of
legal requirements such as co-determination. We now analyze whether adopting such a
23concern for employees and suppliers into the ﬁrm’s objective function would indeed arise as
an equilibrium result. That is, we endogenize the choice of Nl and consider whether ﬁrms
ﬁnd it optimal to adopt organizational structures that put weight on stakeholders and thus
precommit to act like a stakeholder ﬁrm. This reﬂects the situation in countries like France
or Finland where ﬁrms can voluntarily adopt stakeholder concerns. While incorporating Nl
into ﬁrms’ objective functions clearly softens competition and may increase proﬁts, it may
not be an equilibrium for ﬁrms to do this. The reason is that, when ﬁrm m cares about
its stakeholders, it raises its price and lowers its output. Firm l in that case may have an
incentive to commit to being aggressive by lowering its own price to capture a greater market
share, which it achieves by choosing an appropriate organizational structure that commits
it not to care about stakeholders.
We analyze here two cases. First, we study whether, absent any other consideration, a
ﬁrm would naturally choose to assign some positive weight to its general stakeholders in its
objective functions. Second, we consider how consumers’ desires to transact with “socially
conscious” ﬁrms can alter the incentives for ﬁrms to become stakeholder oriented.
5.1 Firms’ Optimal Objective Functions
We extend here the model to introduce a ﬁrst stage where we allow ﬁrms to choose their
own Nl. Assume that at time w =0each ﬁrm l chooses the weight Nl that it places on
stakeholder concerns as part of its objective function. Then, conditional on each ﬁrm’s time
0 choice of Nl,a tt i m ew =1each ﬁrm chooses a price to charge in the ﬁrst period.
In order to precommit to the objective function chosen at the initial stage, ﬁrms must
implement an appropriate decision-making structure within the ﬁrm. As discussed above,
putting workers’ representatives on the board is one extreme way of doing this. Requir-
ing consensus or allowing managers more autonomy are other ways to precommit to pursue
broader objectives. O’Sullivan (2000) contains a discussion of how the organizational struc-
ture can be designed to incorporate stakeholder concerns in the decision making process of
24the ﬁrm.
Solving the two-stage game by backward induction, for given Nl and Nm,ﬁ r ml’s optimal
price at w =1is found from the same maximization as in (8). Solving the ﬁrst order condition
gives the following reaction function
sl1 =

























and similarly sm1 as in (13). Solving these simultaneously gives
b sl1 (Nl>N m)=
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The function b sm1 (Nl>N m) can be found similarly.
At w =0 ,ﬁ r ml then maximizes the objective function reﬂecting the market value of
the ﬁrm with respect to Nl, after substituting in the equilibrium prices b sl1 (Nl>N m) and
b sm1 (Nl>N m).F o rﬁ r ml, the objective is:
max
Nl
b Yl(Nl>N m)=H[l1(b sl1> b sm1)] + I(b sl1  f)[(1  I(b sm1  f))
P
2 + I(b sm1  f)
G
2 ]> (19)
where b Yl(Nl>N m)=Yl(b sl1 (Nl>N m)> b sm1 (Nl>N m)). In deﬁning the maximization problem
with respect to Nl we are implicitly assuming that the ﬁrm decides to implement a decision-
making structure that explicitly incorporates a concern for stakeholders (that is Nl A 0)i f
this maximizes the value of the ﬁrm to shareholders.
Solving the ﬁrst order condition for both ﬁrms’ choice it can be shown that the unique
symmetric equilibrium involves
b Nl = b Nm =m a x
½
J
4e2  2eJ  J22J>0
¾
= (20)
25We can then state the following proposition which summarizes the discussion above.
Proposition 5 When ﬁrms choose the extent to which they should be stakeholder oriented,
then
(a) if J A 0 then b Nl = b Nm A 0 as given by (20) and both ﬁrms choose to be stakeholder
oriented;
(b) if J ? 0 then b Nl = b Nm =0and both ﬁrms choose to be shareholder ﬁrms.
As in the previous section the key to whether ﬁrms endogenously adopt stakeholder
concerns is the sign of J= It can easily be checked that since eAgand JA0 then
4e2  2eJ  J2 A 0 so that it is only the sign of J that is important. If this is negative,
as shown in Figure 4, then ﬁrms will always choose to be shareholder oriented. If this is
positive, so that having a stakeholder orientation is valuable to ﬁrms (see Proposition 1
above) as shown in Figure 5, then ﬁrms will voluntarily choose to be stakeholder oriented,
with b Nl = b Nm A 0 g i v e na si n( 2 0 ) .
As a ﬁnal step, we need to check whether deviating to the shareholder objective function,
with the competitor remaining as a stakeholder ﬁrm, is proﬁtable. To establish this, recall
the deﬁnition of N††,g i v e nb yt h ev a l u eo fN that satisﬁes b Yl(0>N††)=b YVWD(N††).T h i s




(e  J)(2e + J)+eJ2@(2e + J)
2J= (21)
It can now be shown that b Nl = b Nm ?N ††. To see this, note from (20) and (21) that b Nl =
b Nm ?N †† is equivalent to J2 ? 2e2, which is necessarily satisﬁed. Therefore, deviating to
the shareholder objective function is never proﬁtable, and no asymmetric equilibrium exists
where one ﬁrm chooses to be a shareholder ﬁrm and the other chooses to be a stakeholder
ﬁrm. All this implies that the values of b Nl and b Nm in Proposition 5 are the unique equilibrium
in the choice of degree of stakeholder orientation. Therefore, ﬁrms will endogenously choose
a stakeholder-oriented governance structure precisely when such a governance structure leads
26to an increase in ﬁrm value.
5.2 Social Norms in Stakeholder Societies
When the conditions of Proposition 5 are not satisﬁed, it is not worthwhile for ﬁrms to choose
to adopt a concern for stakeholders because of the direct eects on their strategic interaction.
Even in these situations, however, there may be “social norms” or “social concerns” that
induce ﬁrms to become more stakeholder-oriented. For example, as discussed in Section
2, most Japanese ﬁrms appear to believe in a stakeholder orientation. One possible way
to reconcile this with our model is that in societies like Japan ﬁrms that do not adopt a
stakeholder orientation may be “punished” by consumers. To study this issue further and
to capture one aspect of what may be meant by a “stakeholder society,” we suppose in this
section that customers care directly about ﬁrms’ social concerns and have a preference for
buying from such ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we assume that customers prefer to purchase from
ﬁrms that commit to care not only about shareholder value, but also about their other
stakeholders. This implies that if ﬁrm l cares relatively more about its employees and other
stakeholders than ﬁrm m, its demand will be less sensitive to changes in its own price.
One simple way of incorporating this kind of preference by customers is to assume that
e = K(Nl>N m),w i t h CK
CNl ? 0 and CK
CNm A 0.T h i sm e a n st h a tﬁ r ml’s demand becomes less
sensitive to sl1 as ﬁrm l increases its concern for stakeholders, and more sensitive to sl1 as
ﬁrm m increases such concern. Note that we make no assumption on whether overall demand
will increase, but rather only that the share of the market that any given ﬁrm can obtain
by incorporating Nl into its objective function may vary. Indeed, it could well be that if
both ﬁrms care about stakeholders equally, then there is no eect on the demand they face.
Formally, this can be implemented by assuming that K(Nl>N m)=K whenever Nl = Nm.
With this in mind, we can now solve the same maximization problem as before with
respect to Nl as given by (19). We now obtain the following.
27Proposition 6 When customers’ demand is su!ciently responsive to ﬁrms’ concern for









To see why this result holds we dierentiate the ﬁrm’s overall proﬁt b Yl with respect to


















CNl represents the direct eect of an increase in Nl on ﬁrst period expected
proﬁts. This term is positive, as it represents the fact that, holding price constant, an increase
in Nl decreases e, and thus raises the (out of equilibrium) demand for ﬁrm l,r a i s i n gﬁ r ml’s
expected proﬁt. Moreover, this term is greater in magnitude the larger is CK
CNl. It is therefore
straightforward to see that, much as in Proposition 5, in equilibrium ﬁrms will choose b Nl A 0




CNl A 0, they may also choose b Nl A 0 even if J ? 0 as
long as CK
CNl is su!ciently large.
The proposition establishes that for CK
CNl large enough in absolute value, it will always be
the case that b Nl A 0 in equilibrium. In other words, when customers are su!ciently socially
conscious, ﬁrms adopt a governance policy that focuses more generally on stakeholders rather
than just shareholders. Moreover, the comparative statics result suggests that the more
sensitive is consumers’ demand to increases in ﬁrms’ commitment to weighting stakeholders,
the more will ﬁrms commit to providing this.
One conclusion that can be drawn from these cases is that stakeholder societies can be
self-reinforcing in a wide range of situations. The fact that social norms exist that lead
customers to prefer to do business with socially conscious ﬁrms makes ﬁrms want to be
socially conscious. Since every ﬁrm does this, there need be no change in aggregate demand
and sales, but there is an increase in prices and possibly in ﬁrms’ proﬁts as well. Firms thus
compete with each other by setting up their organizational structures so as to in essence
cooperate more. A result of the social concern by consumers, however, is that there is a
28transfer from consumers to the ﬁrms and the workers. An interesting side note is that since
output is reduced, the stakeholder society is also farther away from the e!ciency of perfect
competition, and this happens independently of whether ﬁrms’ proﬁts end up higher or lower.
6 Concluding Remarks
Most of the literature on corporate governance is concerned with ensuring that the ﬁrm is
operated in the interests of shareholders. However, in many countries such as Germany ﬁrms
are required by law or social convention to be not only concerned with shareholders but also
other stakeholders such as employees and suppliers. In this paper we have developed a model
of stakeholder capitalism and have shown that both shareholders and stakeholders can be
made better o if ﬁrms adopt a concern for stakeholders. We also considered the situation
resulting from globalization where stakeholder and shareholders compete and identify the
circumstances where each does better. Since stakeholder ﬁrms can do better than share-
holder ﬁrms we also investigate situations where ﬁrms would voluntarily choose to become
stakeholder oriented and where they would choose to be shareholder oriented. All these
results should hold in more general models of the product market.
Even when stakeholder orientation is not mandated by law as in the case of France or
Finland, we show that there exist circumstances where ﬁrms will voluntarily want to embed
concern for stakeholders in their organizational structures since this increases their value
compared to just focusing on shareholders. One way of doing this is to give managers some
latitude since as employees of the ﬁrm their basic incentives are somewhat aligned with the
workers and other stakeholders. Even in other circumstances where ﬁrm value is not directly
increased in this way, ﬁrms may voluntarily adopt a concern for stakeholders if consumers
prefer to do business with such ﬁrms. Consistent with our model, there is recent evidence
that employee representation on supervisory boards increases ﬁrm e!ciency and market
value (Fauver and Fuerst, 2006). An open question, however, is whether the pricing policies
29of ﬁrms dier systematically as a function of their governance structure, as predicted by
our framework, or whether the higher value accruing to ﬁrms with employee representation
stems from other sources.
The model we have used for the product market is clearly very simple. Many other
features could be added. Also, we have treated shareholders, stakeholders, and consumers
as dierent groups. In practice, of course, there is a large overlap between them. For
example, workers are also consumers. One issue is whether concern for stakeholders can be
welfare improving compared to ﬁrms focusing on shareholders alone. Given that there are
deadweight costs and rents this is a possibility. If so, how broad are these circumstances?
We leave these important issues for future research.
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Number of firms surveyed:  Japan, 68; United States, 82; United Kingdom, 78; Germany, 100; France, 50. 
Source:  Masaru Yoshimori, “Whose Company Is It?  The Concept of the Corporation in Japan and the West.”  Long
Range Planning, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 33-44, 1995 
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35Figure 3: Firm value in the symmetric equilibrium. The figure depicts firm value in the case where 
both firms are shareholder-oriented ( l
SHA V ) or stakeholder-oriented ( l
STA V ) as a function of K. The shape 
of l
STA V  varies depending on the sign of the functionGE .  The threshold K
* is given by 1
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36Figure 4: Firm value in the symmetric and asymmetric equilibrium when 0 GE  . The figure 
depicts the value of an asymmetric shareholder firm ( l (0, ) i j VK ), an asymmetric stakeholder firm 
( l (0, ) j j VK ), a symmetric shareholder firm ( l
SHA V ) and a symmetric stakeholder firm ( l
STA V ) as a 
function of K when 0 GE  . The threshold Kcsatisfies l l ( 0 ,) ( 0 ,) i J VKVK c c   ,





l (0, )  j j VK
l (0, )  i j VK
Kc Kcc Kccc K
37Figure 5: Firm value in the symmetric and asymmetric equilibrium when 0 GE ! . The figure 
depicts the value of an asymmetric shareholder firm ( l (0, ) i j VK ), an asymmetric stakeholder firm 
( l (0, ) j j VK ), a symmetric shareholder firm ( l
SHA V ) and a symmetric stakeholder firm ( l
STA V ) as a 
function of K when 0 GE ! . The threshold K
 satisfies l l (0, ) jS H A VKV
   ,
and K
 satisfies l l (0, ) iS T A VK V
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